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INTRODUCTION 
The Plaintiffs / Appellants ("Neighbors") and Appellee / Mclntyre are 
neighbors in that they own adjacent parcels of land whose boundaries adjoin on a 
terrace about 75 feet above, and overlooking, Little Cottonwood Creek. The 
Creek flows through Mclntyre's property, dividing it so that about one acre is on 
the other side from his house. That acre runs from the Creek's bank up to the top 
of a terrace, where the boundaries adjoin with the Neighbors' boundaries. 
Mclntyre's house and most of his property lie in the Creek's first level flood plain, 
while none of the Neighbors' property is in the flood plain. 
Mclntyre wanted a bridge to connect the two sides of his property, which 
required a permit from the State Engineer to disturb the creek during construction 
to build the bridge's abutments.l That "Permit" is limited, allowing for 
disturbance of the stream for the purpose of constructing the bridge abutments that 
must lie outside the Creek's channel. Once granted, the Permit would allow 
Mclntyre one year to construct the bridge abutments and restore the natural 
stream's bed and banks, even though those abutments do not enter or encroach 
upon the stream or its banks or environs after construction. The work must be 
completed before expiration, and any further or new alteration (such as stream 
lA permit from the Corps of Engineers is also required, but Neighbors chose not address 
that permit at any stage of this case. 
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disturbance to remove the abutments) would require a subsequent permit. 
Neighbors protested Mclntyre's application to the State Engineer, but the 
Permit was granted. Neighbors then requested reconsideration, which was 
granted. After further comment, however, the Permit was again granted.. 
Mclntyre began construction of the bridge after receiving the Permit in October 
2006 because it would expire on Oct. 11, 2007. Appendix A. Mclntyre wanted 
the bridge completed before high water. 
On December 15, 2006, Neighbors filed a complaint in District Court 
before Judge Iwasaki, seeking two things and two things only: 
• A reversal of the State Engineer's approval of Mclntyre's application 
granted on October 11, 2006, which would expire on October 11, 2007; and, 
• A preliminary and permanent injunction to enjoin and restrain Mclntyre 
from constructing a bridge. They chose not to seek an emergency TRO at 
that time. 
Mclntyre moved to dismiss, arguing that, unlike the application process 
where interested parties were allowed to comment, statute required that to have 
standing to appeal the State Engineer's decision, Neighbors must be "persons 
aggrieved" by the decision and that Neighbors had not made the necessary 
allegations to be either aggrieved or afforded injunctive relief. 
While the suit was pending, Mclntyre also faced a practical dilemma - he 
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could suspend construction during litigation, in which case the Permit would 
expire, or he could continue with construction and risk losing if the abutments had 
to be removed. Mclntyre chose the latter and construction openly and obviously 
proceeded without Neighbors seeking to enjoin it.2 
Oral argument for Mclntyre's Motion to Dismiss was scheduled for April 
16, 2007. Then, on March 23, 2007, Neighbors sought an emergency temporary 
restraining order and preliminary injunction to halt the construction of the bridge. 
(R. 159 - 211.) This was five months after the Permit was issued, and after the 
bridge deck had been fabricated and the abutments' concretefootings had been 
poured. An "on record" hearing was held in chambers on that day and the motion 
for Temporary Restraining Order and a preliminary injunction restraining further 
construction was denied. Neighbors did not appeal from that ruling and the bridge 
was soon in place. 
On April 16, 2007, the trial court heard Mclntyre's motion to dismiss for 
lack of standing. Relying to some extent on the proffers from the March 23 rd, 
2007 hearing, Judge Iwasaki ruled Neighbors lacked standing and dismissed the 
case. The bridge was finished before the permit expired on October 11, 2007. 
The Court of Appeals considered Neighbors' arguments and affirmed the trial 
2
 R. 132 In reply to Mclntyre's motion to dismiss they wrote "Plaintiffs do not at 
this time seek either a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction." They ultimately 
waited until Mclntyre had almost completed construction. 
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court's dismissal in a 2-1 decision. Brown v. Division of Water Rights, 2008 UT 
App. 353 ("Op."). 
Mclntyre believes the decision of the majority below was correct and, inter 
alia, it is procedurally and practically meaningless to remand to the trial court for 
consideration of an expired permit or to enjoin the construction of a bridge when 
construction is finished. 
STATEMENT O F JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78A-3-l 02 (2008). 
ISSUE PRESENTED 
This Court has granted certiorari, stating the issue as "whether the majority 
of the panel of the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the district court's 
dismissal based on lack of standing." Neighbors claim this turns on subsidiary 
issues. However, Neighbors' misstate those issues, and properly recast, they are 
framed are as follows: 
1. Whether potential plaintiffs are "aggrieved" by an administrative 
decision granting a permit (and thereby have standing) where they may face some 
possible harm at some indeterminate future time and that possible harm arises 
from: 
a. matters significantly attenuated from the permit's issuance; and 
b. requires a separate additional act of negligence by the 
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defendant. 
2. Whether potential plaintiffs have suffered an adverse effect caused by 
a bridge where they allege the bridge poses an increased risk of contributing to 
flooding if the bridge deck is in place and: 
a. the injury to plaintiffs is not from the flooding itself, but if 
flooding occurs, it may or may not contribute to adverse 
effects; 
b. the bridge deck is removable and will not cause flooding if 
removed; and 
c. the owner of the bridge is subject to a duty to remove the 
bridge deck upon request of authorities and the owner will 
suffer actual flooding if the bridge causes any flooding. 
3. Whether allegations in a complaint are well-pleaded for purposes of a 
motion to dismiss for lack of standing, where those allegations are conclusory in 
nature and overstate or contradict expert reports and exhibits submitted with the 
complaint as exhibits. 
STATEMENT O F THE CASE 
The Neighbors have correctly stated the nature of the case and the decision 
below, except for Neighbors' claim that the Court of Appeals "reformulated" the 
test from Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality Board, 2006 UT 74. As will be 
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explained below, Mclntyre disagrees with Neighbors' reading of the Court of 
Appeals' decision. 
STATEMENT O F FACTS 
Mclntyre concedes the Neighbors' statement of facts is correct, except that 
the following should be added: 
1. Neighbors' statement that Mclntyre obtained a permit from the 
Division to build a bridge is a misstatement. See Opening Br. p. 1. The Division's 
"Stream Channel Alteration Permit" was required operationally, but of itself, did 
not allow the building of a bridge. Rather, as Exhibit E to Neighbor's Complaint 
showed, that Permit allowed the temporary disturbance of Little Cottonwood 
Creek during construction of the bridge's abutments; Once completed those 
abutments are entirely upon property owned by Mclntyre and lie outside the 
Creek's channel. (R. 89, Exhibit E to Neighbor's Complaint.) 
2. In addition to the Division's Permit, the bridge must meet the 
requirements of Salt Lake County Flood Control (R. 11) and be approved by their 
engineers, which Plaintiffs never contested. Inter alia, County Flood Control 
requires as follows: 
Private bridges and decks must be designed so as to allow removal 
without significant structural damage to the flood control facility 
[here Little Cottonwood Creek]. Property owners must agree to 
remove decks upon request by Salt Lake County for maintenance and 
other purposes. 
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Salt Lake County Public Works Flood Control Engineering, General Guidelines 
for all Permit Applications; Online resource at 
http://www.pweng.slco.org/flood/html/permitAppGuide/permitAppGuideH.html 
(last accessed June 3, 2009). 
3. Neighbors did not and could not allege that either of them owns 
property adjoining Little Cottonwood Creek, or that their property lies on the first 
level flood plain. Thus, flooding and erosion caused by the Creek would never 
directly impact Neighbors' properties. ( R. 1-8; see R. 25, 28, 69 and 113 (noting 
the river terrace where Neighbors' properties lie is 75f above the first level flood 
plain.)) 
4. The Division's Permit was issued by the State Engineer on October 
11, 2006 and expired on October 11, 2007. (R. 38-39) 
5. The State Engineer's response to Plaintiffs' request for 
reconsideration, which Neighbors attached to their Complaint, pointed out that 
"the natural condition of the stream is not being affected by the construction of 
this bridge. No part of the structure is in the stream channel." (R.89, Exhibit E to 
Complaint.) 
6. The Secor Report relied on by Neighbors, when fairly read, does not 
state that the construction of Mclntyre's bridge will cause harm; Rather it notes 
that even without the bridge the west bank of the Creek and the escarpment area 
7 
are at "significant risk of further erosion and potential property damage." 3 ( R. 26) 
In part at least, that is because part of the river terrace slope, the escarpment, 
already "is in direct contact with the Creek's Channel." ( R. 25) The river terrace 
is made up of deltaic deposits, primarily sand and gravel, and "its steep slope is 
quite unstable unless vegetated." ( R. 25) Thus, "building the bridge only 
increases the risk." (R. 26) 
7. The second Secor Report also opines that the decking of the bridge 
may cause floating debris to be caught at times of extreme flooding. (R. 65-68.) 
It fails to note, however, that the bridge is built with a removable deck that can 
and must be lifted as required Salt Lake County Flood Control ( supra), such as 
times of extreme flood potential. (R. 113.) Logically, Secor's opinion on this 
aspect requires an inference that Mclntyre will fail to fulfill his duty to keep the 
bridge clear of debris or remove the deck. See (R. 38, item 3) (requiring 
Mclntyre to monitor during high water events for debris passage, during 
construction). 
SUMMARY O F THE ARGUMENT 
Under any analysis, the claims regarding the Permit and those brought by 
the Sorensons cannot survive because there is no standing. First, with respect to 
3The escarpment is owned by "Calder, " a third party who is a neighbor to both Brown 
and Mclntyre who did not protest and was not a party.(R. 252, Tr. 8,1. 15- 20, p. 9,11. 3-4.) 
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the Permit, the third factor in Sierra Club's analysis, redressability, is missing. 
The Permit is not an operational permit, like a drivers' license or the operating 
permit in Sierra Club. It is akin to a building permit and expired in October 2007, 
after the Bridge was built. Thus, the Permit cannot be modified, as the Court 
alluded to as a possibility in Sierra Club, and it cannot be revoked because it 
doesn't exist any more. No party has standing with respect to the Permit because 
there are no claims that can be redressed through the Permit itself. 
The Sorensons lack standing because under any standard, the Complaint 
fails to assert allegations showing they met the three requirements from Sierra 
Club. The Complaint itself is fairly devoid of specific references to the Sorensons 
or their circumstances and, by itself, is insufficient. Reference to the Complaint's 
exhibits is needed to determine any specifics. Even that, however, reveals that 
there are no allegations that the Sorensons will suffer any distinct or palpable 
injury as a result of the Bridge. Accordingly, the Sorensons lack standing to 
complain of the Bridge. 
As to the balance of the claims, including claims by the Neighbors in 
general, the decision below was correct. First, the majority decision below 
correctly applied this Court's formulation for standing as set forth in Sierra Club 
v. Utah Dept. Air Quality, 2006 UT 74 and its predecessors. 
The Neighbors characterize decision below as the majority's reformulation 
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of this Court's rule in Sierra Club. The dissent, however, did not disagree with 
the majority's analysis of standing in this case; Judge Thome simply thought the 
Neighbors should have been given a greater opportunity to develop their case. See 
Op., % 18, Thome, J. dissenting ("I do not disagree with the majority's treatment 
of standing law"). The Court of Appeals applied a plain language of the Sierra 
Club ruling and correctly affirmed. As this Court noted in Jenkins v. Swan, courts 
must often decide issues of standing prior to evidence being presented. Jenkins v. 
Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1150 (Utah 1983) (citation omitted). Moreover, the 
Neighbors' Complaint was fairly brief and conclusory. But Neighbors had already 
commissioned and presented two engineering reports, which were attached to their 
complaint. (R. 1-100.) The trial court, the Court of Appeals and this Court can 
correctly review those exhibits and determine whether the Complaint's allegations 
are well pleaded for purposes of a motion to dismiss. And although Neighbors are 
entitled to reasonable inferences, they are not entitled to unreasonable inferences, 
nor are they entitled to speculation. 
In affirming the trial court, the majorit}^ below did not go beyond the first 
prong of the Sierra Club inquiry, which requires that "the party must assert that it 
has been or will be 'adversely affected by the [challenged] actions.'" Sierra Club, 
2006 UT 74,1fl9 (brackets in original, citing Jenkins, 675 P.2d 1145, 1150 (Utah 
1983). The majority read "has been or will be" to mean what it says - "actual or 
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imminent" - that is, in the sense that it has occurred or is at least likely and that 
flows from the actions challenged. Moreover, this case is significantly different 
from Sierra Club and Neighbors simply are not in a position similar to the 
Plaintiffs in that case who did have standing 
I 
Neighbors would have the courts disregard probability and causation as a 
factor, replacing it with mere possibility. In this case it is only through a string of 
unlikely events that the Bridge might cause the damage Neighbors allege. 
Additionally, Neighbors would have this Court just disregard Mclntyre's 
i 
supervening negligence, which would be required for actual damage to occur. The 
Bridge's deck is removable and Mclntyre is under a duty to remove it if requested 
by Salt Lake County Flood Control. Mclntyre's property is in the first level flood 
plain, adjacent to the Bridge, and in high water events, is at direct risk of flooding 
well before the secondary events Neighbors allege even begin. Neighbors ask the 
Court for the unreasonable inference that, in the already unlikely circumstance it 
becomes necessary, Mclntyre will breach his duty to remove the bridge deck. 
Because of this, any damage Neighbors might potentially suffer is completely 
speculative and caused by Mclntyre's subsequent negligence. 
Because no current injury was involved, the majority below correctly read 
the first prong as requiring the Neighbors to allege two things: first, that an injury 
or other adverse consequence might occur as a result of Mclntyre's bridge; and, 
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second, that the injury would occur at some reasonably foreseeable point in the 
future. Neighbors would have the courts dispense with the causal connection as 
well as a reasonable time frame. Under Neighbors' reading the phrase "has been 
or will be adversely affected by the challenged action" would also include 
"potentially, could be or might be," as to the types of injuries and causation. They 
would also eliminate any temporal proximity between the protested event and the 
future injury. This would open the gate for events that may some day have an 
adverse affect, i.e., special conditions may some day occur, causing debris to 
collect under and around Mclntyre's bridge, causing a damming affect, causing 
flooding, which may exacerbate the erosion to the escarpment, which may be 
providing lateral support for Brown's property, thus, causing an adverse affect. 
Under the Neighbors view "has been or will be" has no temporal significance, and 
apparently eons in the future is enough. 
ARGUMENT 
I. There is no Redressable Claim Regarding The Permit Because it 
is Expired. 
Neighbors ask this Court to reverse the decision below and send this case 
back for trial on the merits so their alleged injuries can be redressed, including 
whether the Permit, which has expired, should now be revoked. Op. Brief p.p. 35-
36. Neighbors rely on the analysis used in Sierra Club, 2006 UT 74, 148 P.3d 
960, to argue at the end of their Opening Brief, that they meet the third prong for 
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standing because their "injuries are redressable, just like the injuries in Sierra 
Club." Op. Brief p. 35. Neighbors' claim their injuries from the Permit are 
redressable because "[t]he Division [of Water Rights] has the authority to revoke 
the permit granted Mclntyre." Op. Brief p. 36. 
That, however, is literally nonsensical, simply because the Permit here is 
long expired and so different from the permit in Sierra Club. The permit in Sierra 
Club, was issued by the Division of Air Quality "to construct and operate a [large] 
coal-fired power plant." Sierra Club, 2006 UT 74, ^ [2 (emphasis added). 
i i 
Although plant construction had not begun, there was a permit in place that could 
be revoked, reconsidered, or modified, which in turn, could impact the Sierra Club 
plaintiffs. Their injuries could be redressed through the permit reconsideration 
process. 
Here, however, the Permit is long expired - October 11, 2007, to be exact. 
(R. 38) There is no permit for this Court, the Third District Court, or even the 
Division of Water Rights to revoke, reconsider, modify or adjust. It is a nullity. 
Thus, Neighbors' contention that their injuries from the Permit can be redressed is 
I 
nonsensical. At best, revocation of an expired permit is a legal fiction and as such 
cannot redress any injury. 
Moreover in Sierra Club, the state agency had jurisdiction over certain 
aspects of the power plant and could impact its construction as well as its 
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operation. See Sierra Club j^ 33 ("it has the power . . . [of] at least referring the 
permit to the Division of Air Quality for further analysis to ensure that the 
Executive Secretary's order authorizing the plant's operation complies state and 
federal law"). 
No such authority ever existed here. The Permit was only tangent ially 
related to the bridge at best, and had nothing to do with the bridge's operation or 
continued existence. And once the Bridge was built, even if the Permit was still in 
effect, its revocation would not mandate the Bridge's removal. In fact, another 
permit would likely be required.4 
II. The Court of Appeals Chose The Proper Standard. 
Neighbors argue the majority below misapplied the proper standard, which 
this Court set forth in Sierra Club v. Utah DepL Air Quality, 2006 UT 74. It 
appears to be agreed, however, that Sierra Club sets the general standard to be 
applied for determining standing. Opening Brief p.p. 15-22; see Sierra Club, 
2006 UT 74. f^ 1 ("we take the opportunity to reiterate and clarify Utah's standing 
law"). 
Lest there be any doubt, the Court of Appeals chose Sierra Club as that 
standard, stating as follows: 
4For reasons unknown to Mclntyre, Neighbors never sought a TRO to stay the Permit, nor 
did they seek an interlocutory appeal of Judge Iwasaki's denial of their TRO seeking to enjoin 
the actual construction of the Bridge. Those are the actions Neighbors could have taken and, in 
effect, what they appeal here. 
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First, the party must assert that it has been or will be "adversely 
affected by the [challenged] actions." Second, the party must allege a 
causal relationship "between the injury to the party, the [challenged] 
actions and the relief requested." Third, the relief requested must be 
"substantially likely to redress [***5] the injury claimed." 
Op. U 7 (quoting Sierra Club, 2006 UT 74,f19, 148 P.3d 960 (alterations in 
original), in turn quoting Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145 at 1149-50 (1983)). All 
three prongs must be met. In short, "standing requires a showing of injury, 
causation, and redressability." Ball v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 2007 UT 79, Tf59 
(citations to Sierra Club etc. omitted). 
IIIt The Sorensons Did Not Allege or Demonstrate Even a Possible 
Injury And, Therefore, Under Any Standard Upholding The 
Dismissal of Their Claims is Proper. 
Although Neighbors argue the court below "reformulated" the Sierra Club 
standing analysis, under any plausible reading of Sierra Club and its predecessors, 
Neighbors' Complaint did not allege any particularized injury that might befall the 
Sorensons. They simply claim "me too" to a suppositional injury to the Browns. 
Joseph Sorenson and Kathleen Sorenson are each named once as a party and they 
are named in the paragraph describing the location of the bridge. ( R. 2) 
(Complaint fflf 3, 4, 12). Thereafter, the Complaint refers to the Plaintiffs generally 
and one cannot discern from the Complaint what injury at all the Sorensons might 
incur, much less what injury they would suffer because of the Permit or the 
Bridge. See ( R. 1 - 8, the body of the Complaint). 
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On a motion to dismiss for lack of standing it is Sorensons burden to "show 
that [they have] suffered some distinct and palpable injury that gives [them] a 
personal stake in the outcome of the legal dispute." Ball v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 
2007 UT 79, ^59 (quoting Salt Lake City Corp. v. Prop. Tax Div., 1999 UT 41, 
Ifl 1, 979 P.2d 346 (in turn quoting Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1148 (Utah 
1983)) (alterations in Salt Lake City Corp.); and citing Sierra Club, 2006 UT 74, 
% 19, 148 P.3d 960.) Because nothing in the Complaint shows a distinct and 
palpable injury, one must examine its exhibits to glean what Sorensons' injury 
could be. See Girard v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245, 248 (Utah 1983) (overruled on 
other grounds) ("an exhibit may be considered as a part of a pleading to clarify or 
explain the same"). 
But the Secor Reports, which are attached to the Complaint and aire the 
underlying bases for Neighbors' claims, say precious little about the Sorensons. 
They do state, however, that all Neighbors' properties /development are 75 feet 
above the first level flood plain. Logically, therefore, none are in danger of actual 
flooding( R. 25.), but little else is said about the Sorensons or the Neighbors 
collectively. But the first Secor Report does say that: 
The deltaic deposits which make up the river terrace are primarily 
fine sand and silt. The steep slope is quire unstable unless vegetated. 
* * * * 
A key point is that from approximately 100 yards up stream from 
where the 1st level flood plain starts, to the escarpment located at the 
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downstream end of this area, the western side of the channel has not 
been armored and is therefore, prone to erosion and subsequent 
channel migration. Additionally, it is likely that the channel forces 
responsible for the escarpment have been at least partially enhanced 
by the placement of armoring and channel stabilization efforts along 
the east flank of the creek. 
* * % * 
Photos 7 and 8 show settlement cracks along the eastern side of the 
Brown Residence. 
* * * 
Additionally, SECOR recommends work begin immediately to 
stabilize the escarpment and more completely understand the Brown 
Residence settlement cracks. 
( R. 25 -26, emphases added.) 
Thus, according to Secor, irrespective of the Bridge or Permit, the western 
bank (where the Browns are located) is prone to erosion because it has not been 
armored and the east bank of the Creek has been armored. Also, irrespective of 
the Bridge or Permit, the Brown residence shows settlement cracks and more study 
is needed. However, nothing whatsoever is said about the Sorensens, their 
property, or what impact the Bridge could have on them. 
Apparently, one must guess that the Sorensens are suffering or will suffer 
i 
some injury because the Browns have suffered some settling. One must guess that 
if the Bridge poses some increased risk to the Browns, ipso facto it must pose risk 
to the Sorensons as well. But nothing in the Complaint or the attached Secor 
Reports (R. 24 - 36 and R. 78 - 84) say that; nothing suggests how Sorensons 
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have been or might be harmed; and nothing in the Complaint or the Secor Reports 
say how such harm might be attributed to the Bridge, much less the Permit. 
"A mere allegation of adverse impact is not sufficient; there must also be 
some causal relationship alleged between the injury to the plaintiff and the 
governmental actions." Sierra Club v. Department ofEnvtl Quality, Div. of Solid 
& Hazardous Waste, 857 P.2d 982, 986 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) quoting Jenkins v. 
Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1150 (Utah 1983). As to the Sorensons though, the 
Complaint is not even that. If there is an allegation of adverse impact, no 
particulars are given and there is no mention of a causal relation between the 
imagined injury and Mclntyre's or the government's actions. 
Finally, it must be noted that in the Neighbors' response to Mclntyre's 
motion to dismiss, Sorensons had an opportunity to point the trial court 1o the 
allegations of damage that might befall their property and link the Bridge as the 
cause were it built. Instead, in their responsive memorandum they chose to rely 
on the allegations of their complaint, stating "Plaintiffs' pleadings provide a 
sufficient basis for the Court to conclude . . . that Plaintiffs meet the standing 
requirements." (R. 131 - 132.) To their credit, Neighbors argued that "the 
Sorenson property is also situated above and adjacent to property lying directly in 
the first level flood plain [and] [d]amage to that property will undermine the 
lateral support to the Sorenson property." ( R. 131.) The problem, however, is 
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that this claim is mere argument, and neither the Complaint nor the Secor Report 
say that. Likewise, neither the Complaint nor the Secor Reports make the 
necessary causal link to the Bridge. 
In sum, the Complaint alleges no claims as to the Sorensons and, under any 
plausible reading of Sierra Club, dismissal was proper. 
IV. The Court of Appeals Applied Sierra Club to Properly Achieve its 
Gate-Keeping Function. 
"Utah standing law 'operates as gatekeeper to the courthouse, allowing in 
only those cases that are fit for judicial resolution.'" Sierra Club v. Utah Air 
Quality Bd., 2006 UT 74, f^ 17 quoting Terracor v. Utah Bd. of State Lands & 
Forestry, 716 P.2d 796, 798-99 (Utah 1986). Mclntyre does not dispute 
Neighbors' extensive recitation of the underlying history and policy of Utah's 
standing requirement in general. But Neighbors are incorrect in arguing that the 
Court "below failed to address Sierra Club's holding regarding potential injury . . 
. [and erred] because, contrary to Sierra Club, it denies standing in potential injury 
cases." Op. Brief p. 20. 
The Neighbors' reading of the decision below is simply too broad, because 
nowhere does it decline standing as to potential injury cases in general Rather the 
decision properly confirmed that Neighbors' claims were too speculative under 
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the particular facts of this case.5 Op. f^ 12. Moreover, Neighbors ignore several 
general concepts. 
First, "standing questions are usually raised prior to the introduction of any 
evidence, [and] [courts] will necessarily be required to make a judgment whether 
proof of such a causal relationship is difficult or impossible and whether the relief 
requested is substantially likely to redress the injury claimed." Jenkins v. Swan, 
675 P.2d 1145, 1150 (Utah 1983) (citing K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 
22.20 at 368-70 (1982 Supp.)). Thus, procedurally there was nothing incorrect in 
the Court of Appeals upholding dismissal. Judge Thome's dissent opines the 
Complaint itself was sufficient and bringing the matter for summary judgment 
would have been perhaps better (and perhaps the motion had been converted to 
one). But as noted herein (infra.), Neighbors chose to rest on their pleadings and 
the courts below were well within their authority to review the exhibits attached to 
the Complaint. The dissent below focused on the conclusory allegations of the 
Complaint's body, without viewing them through the lens of its exhibits, which 
revealed the speculative nature of those claims. Op. \ 20, [^22 n. 4. Moreover, it 
did not take into account the fact that the Bridge's deck was removable, and that 
Mclntyre would have to fail or refuse to remove it before any flooding could occur 
5McIntyre is perplexed by Neighbors' continued pursuit of the appeal and this Petition. 
Irrespective of the State Engineer's decision granting the Permit, which is effectively moot, there 
is nothing that would preclude Neighbors from filing a new suit, right now, seeking to have the 
Bridge removed. 
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as a result of the Bridge. 
Second, although standing is a question of law, on appeal, the appellate 
courts "give deference to the district court on factual determinations that bear 
upon the question of standing." Jones v. Barlow, 2007 UT 20, \9 citing Wash. 
County Water Conservancy Dist. v. Morgan, 2003 UT 58, % 18 and 
Kearns-Tribune Corp. v. Wilkinson ,946 P.2d 372, 373 (Utah 1997). 
Here, that is precisely what occurred. The question was raised before the 
introduction of evidence, and Neighbors chose to rely on their pleadings and the 
attached exhibits. The Complaint's allegations were fairly "bare bones" and most 
were "simply conclusory statements that the bridge will alter Little Cottonwood 
Creek's natural stream flow and that Plaintiffs will suffer harm if a flood occurs." 
Op. \ 13. But the attached exhibits and specifically the Secor Reports, showed 
that not only were the Neighbors' allegations conclusory, they were were also 
highly conjectural and speculative. The trial court found as much (R. 218) and 
the majority below gave proper deference when it upheld. Jones v. Barlow, 2007 
UT 20,1J9 {supra). 
The majority below began "by addressing the first part of [the] three-part 
inquiry—whether Plaintiffs have been or will be adversely affected by Mclntyre's 
bridge" Op. \ 8 (emphasis added). Sierra Club and related cases discuss this first 
prong of "adverse effect" mostly in terms of whether the injury to the plaintiff is 
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distinct from generalized damages visited upon the environment or the public at 
large. See Op. \ 8 citing Sierra Club, 2006 UT 74, f 20 (noting that a plaintiffs 
interest must be real and personal). But clearly, there must also be a causal nexus 
to the challenged action. To have standing the party must be "adversely affected 
by the challenged actions." Sierra Club, 2006 UT 74, \\9 (brackets omitted, 
emphasis added). 
The adverse effect in this case was settling in Browns' property. Secor 
believed, but was not certain, that settling was caused by erosion of the 
escarpment. See (R. 26.) ("With the instabilities observed in an around the 
escarpment, as well as the settlement cracks (Photos 7 and 8), further erosion of 
the escarpment may increase the risks for significant property damage"). It could 
also be caused by the instability of the steep slope, which was "primarily fine sand 
and silt." (R. 25.) Given that no direct causal link was established, even between 
the erosion and the adverse effect, the courts below properly inquired about the 
probability that the Bridge itself could have any impact on Browns' settling 
problem. Both courts properly concluded that any connection between the adverse 
effect and the Bridge was too speculative. 
Although Sierra Club was decided on summary judgment and this case on a 
motion to dismiss, that does not gainsay the validity of the decisions below that 
Neighbors claims were speculative. Neighbors chose to rely on their pleadings. 
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Having so chosen, even given the benefit of accepting the Complaint's well-
pleaded allegations true, no court was obliged to accept its conclusory allegations 
as true. See York v. Unqualified Wash. County Elected Officials ,714 P.2d 679 
(Utah 1986) (plaintiff did not establish standing where his "conclusory allegations 
[we]re not supported by reference to any specific facts that show any jeopardy, 
adverse impact, or injury"). 
Moreover, whether any specific allegation was in fact well-pleaded, was 
properly viewed in light of the exhibits Neighbors chose to append to their 
Complaint. Girard v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245, 248 (Utah 1983) overruled on other 
grounds ("an exhibit may be considered as a part of a pleading to clarify or 
explain the same"); see Utah R. Prof. Conduct 3.3(a)(3) (lawyer not to offer 
evidence known to be false). 
The Complaint conclusorily stated that construction of the Bridge will result 
in irreparable harm and damage to plaintiffs and their property. (R. 6.) But it 
failed to particularize how. In Sierra Club, it was accepted that the plant would 
cause emissions and, for purposes of summary judgment, that those emissions 
would cause the injuries sworn to - even if that was some time in the future. No 
such link was shown here. 
Neighbors' Complaint and exhibits showed that something might happen, 
but only through a string of "what ifs." As discussed infra., unlike in Sierra Club, 
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there was no clear causal link between the settling, which was already occurring, 
and the Bridge, which was not yet built. Instead, these "what ifs" were so 
attenuated that it was extremely unlikely that the Bridge itself would ever be the 
proximate cause of Neighbors' alleged damages. First, the Secor Report notes that 
settling is already occurring, not because of the Bridge, but probably because the 
river terrace, which is already in direct contact with the channel, is made up 
primarily of sand and silt and its "steep slope [the steepest being the escarpment] 
is quite unstable unless vegetated." ( R. 25.) Also, "the western side of the 
channel [on which the escarpment lies] has not been armored and is therefore, 
prone to erosion." (R.25.) Importantly, Neighbors' expert report concludes that 
bank has been eroding since it became dry land and Browns counsel conceded 
"that there's always going to [be] erosion where we have flowing water." (R. 256, 
Tr. P.8). None of this has anything to do with the Bridge. 
As to the Bridge, Secor opines that it " could create a channel constriction," 
not that it necessarily will. ( R. 26.) If a constriction resulted, Secor did not opine 
that water will get backed up behind the Bridge, only that it could provide an 
"opportunity" for that to happen - that is, //there are high flows and //debris gets 
caught. Id. Then, if all that comes to pass, the escarpment, which is Calder's and 
is already eroding because it is unarmored, has the potential for further erosion. 
Id. If Calder's escarpment erodes more because of all this, it "may increase the 
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risks for significant property damage." ( R. 26) This daisy chain of conjecture was 
attenuated enough, but doesn't explain how a damming effect several hundred feet 
upstream from the escarpment would do more than cause flooding on Mclntyre's 
property, which would then return to the Creek well upstream of the escarpment. 
That is the scenario laid out by Neighbors' Complaint and exhibits, which 
the trial court was entitled to rely on, and which it found was just too speculative. 
The majority below correctly upheld the trial court. 
A. Unlike Sierra Club, Neighbors Do Not Allege a Significant 
Connection Between The Bridge And Any Adverse Effect. 
Neighbors, however, claim to be situated similarly to those plaintiffs 
granted standing in Sierra Club and also claim that the majority below 
"reformulated" Sierra Club's requirements. Under Neighbors' analysis, though, 
there is no temporal component; the mere potentiality of injury is sufficient, no 
matter when it may manifest itself. But this case is significantly different and, 
despite the different postures, the decision below was entirely consistent with the 
Court's decision in Sierra Club. 
First, in Sierra Club, there was no question under the state of the pleadings 
that the plaintiffs had alleged injuries that would occur as a result of the power 
plant. In Sierra Club two things were clear for summary judgment purposes: (1) 
all parties conceded (or perhaps judicial notice taken) that there would be 
emissions from the plant; (2) the plaintiffs' affidavits stated specific, distinct and 
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palpable injuries that would happen to them from those emissions, for example: 
In his affidavit, Mr. Cass alleges the plant will emit pollutants that 
will impair visibility around his home and on the Colorado Plateau 
and that this decreased visibility will affect his livelihood as a 
videographer. . . . [i]f approved, the plant's emissions will impair his 
health . . .and decrease the value of his property . 
Sierra Club, ^ 4 (emphases added). 
Ms. Roberts1 affidavit claims that if the plant is approved she will 
suffer injury because the plant will emit pollutants that will 
contaminate the soil and damage her crops , thereby jeopardizing her 
livelihood. Likewise, she argues that the plant's emissions will 
contaminate the waterways that she and her family use to irrigate the 
crops they later eat. Ms. Roberts also asserts that the emissions from 
the plant's construction and operation will negatively affect her 
health. 
Sierra Club, \ 5. 
Thus, in Sierra Club, there was an adverse effect and a direct causal 
connection between those harms and the plant. That, however, is not this case. 
Brown does not allege that the Bridge is damaging or will directly damage his 
property, but rather that settling is causing damage and settling is already 
occurring. (R. 1-9 and R. 24 - 26) What he does allege is that erosion to the 
escarpment is likely causing settling and erosion is occurring because the 
escarpment is unarmored. The Bridge may (or may not) cause flooding and 
flooding may (or may not) exacerbate that erosion. When such flooding might 
occur and whether the Bridge would be the cause were simply unknown. Thus, 
the speculative damage to Neighbors would arise thorough a chain of distant 
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circumstances. 
B. The Risk Neighbors Assert Does Not Stem From The Bridge, 
But From an Independent Intervening Act. 
Neighbors go to great lengths to establish that increased risk can, itself, be a 
harm. Mclntyre concedes that in some circumstances that can be true. That is not 
to say, however, that mere speculation is sufficient for standing purposes. No 
Court has gone there, nor should it. 
As if the series of speculative events above did not relegate Neighbors' 
claims to bin of speculation though, before any adverse impact could actually 
result from the Bridge, one more speculation is required: that Mclntyre (who does 
live on the first level flood plain, 75 feet below Plaintiffs) will just sit back and be 
inundated as the water backs up behind his removable bridge. Thus, even 
accepting all Neighbors' conjectural claims, they lack standing because the 
increased risk stems not from the Bridge, but from an independent act or omission 
by Mclntyre at some time in the indeterminate future. Mclntyre would still have 
to commit an independent act of shear recklessness and fail to remove the Bridge's 
removable deck. This is another factor not raised or addressed in Sierra Club. 
As required by Salt Lake Flood Control, the Bridge's deck is removable, 
and Mclntyre is obligated to remove it when do directed. (R. 113); see Salt Lake 
County Public Works Flood Control Engineering, General Guidelines for all 
Permit Applications, online at 
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http://www.pweng.slco.org/flood/html/permitAppGuide/permitAppGuideH.html. 
Unlike the Neighbors, Mclntyre lives on the flood plain, virtually next to 
the Bridge and if a problem arises, his property will be at risk of actual flooding 
well before the indirect impacts alleged by Neighbors even begin. Thus, 
Neighbors' claims required an inference that Mclntyre would refuse or fail to 
remove the bridge deck if that were to become necessary. But that is contrary to 
common sense, in violation of his obligation to Salt Lake Flood Control, and is a 
contingency that borders on inconceivable 
Although it is not clear from the majority opinion below, this appears to be 
just the type of factor it considered when it declined to "infer what events might 
transpire to cause [] harm in the future." Op. [^15, quoting LPA Inc. v. Chao, 211 
F. Supp. 2d 160, 164 (D.D.C. 2002). The majority noted the Neighbors alleged 
potential dangers, but even those were contingent on things that might never 
happen: 
Indeed, the engineer's report attached to the complaint shows a 
danger of possible damage to Plaintiffs' property if Little Cottonwood 
Creek's water flows reach the same levels that they did in 1984. 
However, the potential dangers are contingent on key, unknown 
events—an increased water flow or a flood—which are dictated by 
unknown weather patterns. Essentially, Plaintiffs1 injury depends on 
"'contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated or indeed 
may not occur at all.'" 
Op. % 14 (emphasis added) (quoting Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 
473 U.S. 568, 580-81, 105 S. Ct. 3325, 87 L. Ed. 2d 409 (1985) (quoting 13A 
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Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 3532 (2d ed. 1984)). 
It is possible that the trial court and majority below missed the importance 
of the fact that the Bridge deck is removable. Yet, such independent intervening 
events are critical because they directly impact and interrupt the causal chain that 
is required under any standing analysis, be it Utah or federal. See Sierra Club v. 
Utah Air Quality Bd., 2006 UT 74, ^ [19 (the party must (1) be adversely affected 
by the challenged actions and (2) there must be a causal relationship between the 
injury to the party, the challenged actions and the relief requested) and Jenkins v 
Swan, 675 P.2d at 1149-50 (also enunciating these two factors); see also Friends 
of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl Servs .Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-181 (U.S. 2000) 
(similar federal standard requires "(I)- • • "injury in fact" that is (a) concrete and 
particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the 
injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action"). 
Here, the removability of the Bridge deck necessarily breaks that already 
tenuous chain of events that Neighbors invoke to assert potential risk from the 
Bridge. Mclntyre's failure or refusal to remove the Bridge deck is not an 
inference to which Neighbors are entitled, but rather complete and irrational 
speculation. Yet "when the facts are so tenuous, vague, or insufficiently 
established that determining causation becomes "completely speculative," the 
claim fails as a matter of law." Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433, 439 (Utah 1996) 
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citing Mitchell v. Pearson Enters., 697 P.2d 240, 246 (Utah 1985) and Steffensen 
v. Smith's Management Corp., 820 P.2d 482, 486-87 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), aff d, 
862 P.2d 1342 (Utah 1993). 
V. Neighbors5 Concept of Standing Should Not be Adopted by This 
Court. 
Neighbors essentially argue that the first standing factor - "has been or will 
be adversely affected" should be expanded to include "potentially, could or might 
be adversely affected." The gatekeeping function would be reduced to merely 
inquiring if there is any possibility of injury at some unknown time in the future 
and whether there is a possible a causal relationship between that someday injury 
and challenged actions - no matter how remote. Under Neighbors' concept 
standing is conferred on the farmer in Kansas for a claim against the boy in Brazil 
for releasing the butterfly, based on the ephemeral "Butterfly Effect." 6 
The majority below properly declined to be so expansive, which is not to 
say that Neighbors do not raise valid concerns about how to deal with potential 
injuries and standing. But this is not the case to raise them because there are 
significant analytical difficulties that Neighbors sidestep and this case is simply 
different than Sierra Club, which is why the majority below was correct. 
6For who released the butterfly, whose wings moved the air, which changed 
the weather, which in turn had an impact on the tornado, whose course changed 
and destroyed the farmer's barn 
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CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals decision should be affirmed because Neighbors' 
claims as to the Permit cannot be redressed by any relief. The Neighbors alleged 
injuries arising out to Bridge itself are too conjectural and would require a future 
intervening act of negligence or recklessness on Mclntyre's part. 
,j rt. Dated this _&_ day of June, 2009 
Richard R. Go 
James A. Mc 
Sarah E. Viola 
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O c t o b e l l 2 0 0 6RECEIVED 
OCT 1 2 2006 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
RE: Stream Channel Alteration Permit Number 06-57-29SA to construct a bridge over Little 
Cottonwood Creek at 558 East 5600 South in Salt Lake County. 
EXPIRATION DATE: October i 1, 2007 
Your application to Alter a Natural Stream Channel Number 06-57-29SA is hereby approved 
pursuant to the requirements of Section 73-3-29 of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953. This 
approval also constitutes compliance with Section 404 (e) of the Clean Water Act (33 USC 
1344) pursuant to General Permit 040 issued to the State of Utah by the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers on October 15, 1987, and amended May 4, 2004. 
L The expiration date of this approved application is October 11, 2007. The expiration 
date may be extended, at the State Engineer's discretion, by submitting a written 
request outlining the need for the extension and the reasons for the delay in 
completing the proposed stream alteration. 
2. A copy of this approved permit must be kept onsite at any time the work under this 
approved permit is in progress. 
3. During high water events, the bridge must be monitored to allow for debris passage. 
4. To avoid proliferation of bridge crossings, this office will require your consideration 
in allowing others to utilize the bridge, provided they adequately compensate you for 
a portion of the cost of bridge construction and gain a legal right-of-way. 
. 5. Excavated material and construction debris may not be wasted in any stream Channel 
or placed in flowing waters, this will include material such as grease, oil, joint 
coating, or any other possible pollutant. Excess materials must be wasted at an 
upland site well away from any channel. Construction materials, bedding material, 
excavated material, etc. may not be stockpiled in riparian or channel areas. 
6. Machinery must be properly cleaned and fueled offsite prior to construction. 
7. Equipment should work from the top of the bank or from the channel to minimize 
disturbance to the riparian area and to protect the banks. Heavy equipment should 
avoid crossing and/or disturbing wetlands. 
1594 West North Temple, Suite 220, PO Box 14630Q, Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6300 
telephone (801) 538-7240 • facsimile (801) 538-7467 • www.waterrights.utah.gov 
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06-57-28SA 
October 11,2006 
This Decision is subject to the provisions of Rule R655-6 of the Division of Water Rights and to 
Sections 63-46b-13^nd 73-3-14 of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, which provide 
t^fiTin|pritfr^^ for Reconsideration with the State Engineer, or an appeal with the 
appropriate District Court. A Request for Reconsideration must be filed with the State Engineer 
within 20 days of the date of this decision. However, a Request for Reconsideration is not a 
prerequisite for a court appeal. A court appeal must be filed within 30 days after the date of this 
Decision, or if a Request for Reconsideration has been filed, within 30 days after the date the 
Request for Reconsideration is denied. A Request for Reconsideration is considered denied 
when no action is taken 20 days after the Request is filed. 
If you have any questions or need further clarification, please contact Roddy Pirouznia at 801-
538-74*5. 
Sincerely, 
Jerry D. Olds, P.E. 
State Engineer 
JDO/rp/jm 
Enclosure 
This permit was mailed on f)cJT II AOQia to the addressee and the following: 
By: ^ZuUi /y^cCtifcfr/i^J 
^0ndy Mafeon, Secretary 
Corps of Engineers 
John Mann - Regional Engineer 
Dave Ruiter - EPA 
Carolyn Wright - Dept. of Natural Resources 
Ashley Green - Wildlife Resources 
Chris Springer - Salt Lake County 
MCM Engineering 
Calvin S. Johnson 
Lawrence & Marilyn Brown 
Gregory & Susan Hansen 
Joseph & Kathleen Sorenson 
Kirton & McConkie 
